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Inthis paper, we ijuvestigate incentive structures within partnerships.
Partnerships provide a classic example of the tradeoff between risk spreading and
moral hazard. The degree to which firms choose to spread risk and sacrifice
efficiency incentives depends upon risk preferences, for which
data are typically unavailable. We are able to overcome this difficulty due to the
existence of a unique data set on a prominent form of professional partnership;
medical group practice.
We consider a two-stage model In which agents choose effort in response to
incentives and in which the firm can choose two different Instruments to affect
incentives and to spread risk: the compensation method and the number of members.
There are two new theoretical results. First, relative to the compensation method
or group size which would be chosen in the absence of risk or risk aversion, the
best compensation method will be one which sacrifices efficiency incentives in order
to spread risk, and the best membership size will exceed the first best size for the
same reasons. Second, a further increase in risk or risk aversion leads the firm to
sacrifice more efficiency incentives in order to spread more risk. Hence, firms who
are more risk averse or face greater uncertainty pay larger risk premiums In terms
of sacrificed output due to shirking.
The empirical results are striking and consistent with the theory. Firms which
report møre risk aversion have greater departures from first-best organizational
incentive structures. Specifically, increased risk aversion leads to compensation
arrangements which spread more risk through greater sharing of output and to
decreased group size in order to counteract diminished incentives. We also find
that compensation arrangements that have greater degrees of sharing of output across
physicians significantly reduce each physician's productivity, whereas reductions in
group size significantly increase productivity. The estimated premium associated
with risk aversion accounts for almost eleven percent of gross income, comparing the
most risk averse to the least risk averse physicians in the sample.
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Oneof the primary contributions of economic theory in the last twenty years Is
the recognition that first-best efficiency incentives must be compromised in order
to spread risk In the presence of imperfect information. This was first realized in
the study of insurance', and has been extended to a wide variety of situations. One
prominent area of analysts has been the structure of incentives within an
organization.2 In this paper, we focus on the incentive structure within
partnerships. Partnerships provide a classic example of the tradeoff between risk
spreading and moral hazard. They form In order to split fixed costs and spread risk
due to uncertainty. Risk is spread through some degree of sharing of outputamong
firm members. The greater the degree of output sharing, however, the stronger is
the incentive for members to shirk and thus free ride on the effort of other
members.
Although there has been extensive theoretical analysis of this point, the
corresponding empirical literature is sparse. The existing empirical literature has
focused mainly on the impact of compensation method on firm performance, and has not
typically examined the determinants of compensation method. The studies In this
area have covered executive compensation, compensation of workers, and employee
profit-sharing.3 With the exception of Seller (1984), however, these papers do not
consider the impact of risk aversion on compensation method and efficiency.
In this paper we theoretically and empirically analyze the tradeoff between risk
spreading and efficiency incentives in partnerships. The degree to which firms
'The classic reference is Zeckhauser (1970).
2See Holmstrdm and Tirole (1989) for an excellentsurvey.
For example, on executive compensation see Jensen and Murphy (1990),
Abowd (1990), Gibbons and Murphy (1989, 1990), leonard (1990). On worker
compensation, see Pencavel (1977), Seller (1984), Brown (1990). On employee
profit-sharing, see Fitzroy and Kraft (1987).choose to spread risk and sacrifice efficiency incentives depends upon risk
preferences, for which data are typically unavailable. It is this data limitation
which has heretofore stymied attempts at empirical analysis. We are able to
overcome this difficulty due to the existence of a unique data set on a prominent
form of professional partnership; medical group practice. These data are unique in
that they contain detailed information on risk aversion, compensation arrangements,.
physician productivity, and other aspects of the internal organization of these
fins.
We model partnerships as fins who use two instruments to affect incentives and
to spread risk: the compensation method and the number of members. To our
knowledge, this case has not been previously examined. Previous models of the
choice of Incentives under risk have considered the case where the fin has only one
choice variable: either compensation or membership. The agency literature has
examined the case In which the finn chooses compensation method, given a fixed
number of agents (e.g., I4olmstrm, 1982). These are models of team production,
which implies that the agents in an organization are jointly subject to a single
random shock. The consequence of this is that risk cannot be spread by adding
members; only by compromising incentives, or by diversifying production activities.
The literature on labor-managed firms (e.g., Ireland and Law, 1982) has concerned
itself with the opposite case; fixed compensation method (equal sharing) and
variable membership. The result here is that risk can be spread if members' random
shocks are not perfectly correlated.
Professional partnerships share some aspects of both these models. Production in
professional partnerships is typically non-joint across members of the firm, i.e.,
themembers produce independently of one another. Partners also face demand curves
fortheir individual services, Consequently there is lessthan perfect correlation
betweenindividuals' stochastic shocks, implying that risk can be spread by adding
2members. Professional partnerships also employ a variety of compensation methods.
These institutional features Imply a model which leads to two new theoretical
results. First, relative to the compensation method or group size which would be
chosen in the absence of risk or risk aversion, the best compensation method will be
one which sacrifices efficiency incentives in order spread risk, and the best
membership size will exceed the first best size for the same reasons. Second, a
further increase in risk or risk aversion leads the firm to sacrifice more
efficiency incentives in order to spread more risk. Hence, firms who are more risk
averse or face greater uncertainty pay larger risk premiums in terms of sacrificed
output due to shirking. The specific way in which the compensation method and group
size are adjusted, however, is indeterminate. Both mechanisms could be used to
spread risk, or only one could be used to spread risk and the other used to mitigate
the inefficiency incentives.
Our empirical results are striking and consistent with the theory. Firms which
report more risk aversion have greater departures from first-best organizational
incentive structures. Increased risk aversion leads to compensation arrangements
which spread more risk through greater sharing of output and to decreased group size
in order to counteract diminished incentives. We also find that compensation
arrangements that have greater degrees of sharing of output across physicians
significantly reduce each physician's productivity, whereas reductions in group size
significantly increase productivity. The estimated premium associated with risk
aversion accounts for almost eleven percent of gross income, comparing the most risk
averse to the least risk averse physicians in the saivçle.
II.MEOICALGROUP PICTICE
Currentlyover 61% of U.S. physicians practice in some type of group setting,
(Gonzalez and Enviions, 1988) and this percentage has been increasing over time.
3Variation in practice setting and incentive structure have been shown to
significantly affect physician behavior.' This Is of specific interest to
policymakers because of concern that the financial incentives used In Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) will encourage physicians to limit medical
services.Indeed, Congress is considering specific aspects of a law scheduled to go
into effect in 1990 that would prohibit Medicare participating Kilos from adopting
financial Incentives whih would reduce the availability of medical care to
enrollees (U.S. General Accounting OffIce, 1988).
Medical group practices tend to be relatively horizontal in structure. Most
physicians are owners of the group practice, and ownership rights tend to be
undifferentiated (Freidson, 1915). Held and Reinhardt (1919) report that 93% of the
medical groups in their sample are owned by the physicians, and Lee (1990) states
that 84% of physicians in another survey of group practices participate in
ownership. Most of these groups have some non-owner physicians, but these are
typically recent hires who are rapidly promoted to ownership. Indeed, Lee reports
that 87% of the finis permit ownership after two years, and none have a probationary
period longer than four years.
Decision-making typically occurs collectively, rather than independently. In
fact, the empirical evidence shows that groups rather than individuals set fees and
make resource decisions. Held and Reinhardt find that individual physicians set
their own fees in only 10% of groups, hire nurses in 8%, and can purchase capital
equipment In less than 2%. Kralewski, Pitt, and Shatin (1985) report even lower
figures for independent physician decision-making: IS set their own fees, 4% hire
their own nurses and less than 1% purchase their own equipment. Lee also confirms
'For example, see Newhouse (1973), Sloan (1974), Held and Reinhardt
(1979), Gaynor (1989), Gaynor and Pauly (1990).
4these findings.
The institutional literature suggests several reasons why physicians organize in
partnerships: to spread fixed costs and exploit economies of scale, to smooth work
schedules, and to exploit reputational economies of scale. Optimal scale in medical
practice has been studied extensively.5 Most of these studies conclude that, while
economies of scale exist in the production of physician services, they are exhausted
at relatively low levels. Nonetheless, the empirical distribution ofgroup sizes
appears to be inconsistent with these findings, in that groups are much larger on
average than is necessary to fully exploit (estimated) scale economies. Some
economies may also be achieved by combining different specialties In order to
minimize referral costs. In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that physicians
form groups to smooth out irregularities In work schedules by covering for one
another. Finally, the importance of reputational economies of scale for medical
practices has been documented anecdotally in Getzen (1984).
In this paper we argue that risk aversion is another major reason for physicians
to form partnerships. Partnerships allow physicians to spread risk throughsonie
degree of output sharing. One would expect more risk averse groups to have greater
output sharing and larger memberships in order to better spread risk. The greater
the degree of output sharing and the larger the group size, however, thegreater the
incentive for individual members to shirk. Thus risk aversion is likely to be a
major factor In the organization and efficiency of medical group practices.
We Investigate these issues using data from a survey of 6353 physicians in 957
medical group practices collected in 1978 by Mathematica Policy Research for the
National Center for Health Services Research. These data are unique in that they
5For example, see Frech and Ginsburg (1974), Kimbell and Lorant(1977),
Reinhardt, Pauly, and Held (1979), Harder and Zuckerman (1985).
5contain measures of physicians attitudes towards risk, group compensation methods
and organizational structures, and Individual physician productivity. Risk aversion
is measured by physician responses to a question about the importance of regular
income. The possible responses ranged from one to four, increasing with the
importance of regular income. The compensation scale varies between one and ten,
where one indicates no relationship between compensation and individual
productivity, and ten indicates a perfect relationship. Group size measures the
number of full time equivalent physicians in the fir, reported in six intervals.
We use the group mean of each value of the compensation scale and group size in the
analysis. Figures I, 2 and 3 present the frequency distributions of these
variables. They show substantial variation in risk preferences, compensation
methods, and group sizes.
We get a preliminary idea of how risk preferences influence the organization of
medical group practices from Table 1, where the means of the compensation scale and
of group size are reported for physicians by their rankings of the importance of
regular Income. The compensation scale Is monotonically decreasing as the
importance of regular income increases, and group size moves in the same direction,
although non-monotonically. Thus, physicians that report themselves to be more risk
averse are in groups which have compensation methods with a greater degree of
sharing of output and which are smaller in size. This suggests that physicians use
the compensation method and group size to spread risk. In the rest of the paper we
investigate the degree to which partnerships use output sharing and group size tD
trade off efficiency incentives for risk spreading.
III. ThEORY
We nowpresenta formal model of partnerships. The theory concerning choice of
6incentives for an organization facing risk is well established. In this version,
partners individually choose their own actions (which we call effort) in response to
firm wide incentives, whereas firm incentives are collectively chosen by the
partners, given each individual's reaction function. This is modeled as a two stage
game in which the firm is the leader, and individual partners are the followers.
Reaction functions for the partners are derived in section A, and the firm's choice
of incentives is analyzed in section B. Comparative statics are considered in
section C.
A. The Partners
The partners in the firm are assumed to be utility maximizing agents who make
decisions over "work effort in response to the incentives present in the firm's
compensation method. The compensation structure is treated as fixed by any partner,
although it is endogenous as far as the group as a whole is concerned. Work effort
is defined as the total input to production by an individual partner. This
encompasses both time and intensity, where intensity can be thought of as how hard
an individual works.In the medical model, work effort can be thought of as
spending more time with a patient and paying more attention to diagnosis and
treatment. More work effort, therefore, results in higher quality care, and higher
quality care raises the demand for physician services. There is a nonpecuniary
(disutility) cost to effort, since effort is the opposite of leisure on the job.
The benefit to additional effort is that it produces additional quality, which
attracts customers. Additional customers bring the partner additional income.
Uncertainty is present in that each partner faces a demand curve for his services
which is subject to a stochastic shock. In the medical example, the number of
patients who demand a physician's services fluctuates with factors which cannot be
7perfectly observed by the physician. These factors include variations in patterns,
types, or severity of illness (e.g., seasonal or epidemiological effects).
variations in insurance coverage, problems In collecting revenues, and unexpected
reputatlonal effects of events such as medical malpractice suits. A partner's
demand is affected in a deterministic way by the price charged by the firm, the
quality supplied by the individual partner, and other factors. Formally, partner
i's demand Is
q1 —q(P, z1 IX)+c1,c —F(O,Of2), (I)
where
sthequantity of output demanded from partner I,
P •theprice per unit charged by the firm,
•the quality per unit of output supplied by partner i,
X •exogenousfactors affecting demand, such as consumer
characteristics, the qualities and prices of other firm members,
and market level factors6, and
• the stochastic shock, which has distribution function F with mean zero and
variance Thec are assumed to be uncorrelated across partners.7
The deterministic portion of the partner's demand depends negatively on
6This can be thought of as a residual demand function, which is conditional on
these "other factors." Thus, exogenous factors which determine the level of market
demand. the firm's market share, and the agent's share of firmdemandare expressed
as X.
TThe crucial assumption is that the error terms not be perfectly correlated
within groups. Extension to imperfectly correlated errors does not affect the
qual itative results.
Bprice and positively on the quality produced by the partner8.
Quality per unit of service is produced by the Individual partner with his own
effort, e1, and with other fixed factors, 9 (e.g., other labor, capital, ability),
—z(e1I°), (2)
where z1 is quality per unit of output9, and z is assumed strictly concave.10
(ff?rt shifts the partner's demand function via its effect on quality, and is the
only means by which the partner can influence demand. The partner is assumed to
choose effort to maximize utility, which depends directly on the partner's net
income and therefore on the level of effort applied.
A mean-variance utility function is used to represent preferences in thepresence
of uncertainty. This model highlights the tradeoff between efficiency and risk-
spreading in a simple way, and is consistent with a broad range of preference
structures. Meyer (1981) shows that utility can be represented as a function of the
first two moments of the distribution of the random variable when the outcome
variable depends linearly on the random variable, as is the case in our model. As
tThe partner's quality will affect demand in twoways: by increasing his
quality relative to that of others in the fini and thereby increasing his share of
firm demand, and by increasing the firm's quality and therefore its market share.
See Schmalensee (1977) for a complete exposition.
cit is assumed that there are constant returns to scale in theproduction of
quality over units of quantity, i.e., total quality equals the product of per unit
quality and total output, q1.z1.
101n practice, partners' quality production functionsmay not be completely
independent.While the independence assumption does not affect the qualitative
results, it is testable.We develop a formal test In the section on empirical
specification.
9we demonstrate later, this is a testable assumption)1
The mean-variance utility function is further assumed to be additively separable
in money and actions (effort). Let partner i's utility be given by
— - - v1(e1), (3)
where
• i's utility,
• the expectation of i's net income,
B aaparameter indicating the impact of variation in income on utility. B is
equal to one-half the measure of (constant) absolute risk aversion.
• the variance of l's net income, and
• the private non-monetary cost of effort.v1 is assumed to be strictly
convex in e1.
A partner's income Is determined by the compensation structure and the random






"In addition, Chamberlain (1983) has shown that any member of the class of
symetric, spherical distributions will generate the mean-variance model as an exact
representation of preferences.Epstein (1985) employs a formulation of decreasing
absolute risk aversion (DAM) to show that the mean-variance functional form of a non-
expected utility model is consistent with the postulates which follow from DAM.
This form is highly simplified: in particular, the issue of cost sharing has
been treated in an extremely stark manner, and linearity is imposed. Nonetheless,
real world co4llpensatlon structures are often extremely simple, and linearity is the
norm, rather than the exception (see Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987 for an analysis of
the optimality of linear incentives). This is the case with physician practices,
which we analyze in this paper.
I0a atheproportion of revenue generated by i that he keeps, (0,1],
P •theprice of output,
n athenumber of members of the finn,and
FC •fixedcosts.
Fixed costs are assumed increasing and concave in group size (e.g., the cost of name
plaques, offices, or examining rooms) so FC—FC(n), 9FC/øn>o, Ô2FC/8n2<O. The first
term in (4) Is the portion of revenue generated by i which he keeps, the second term
is his share froiiithefinn's revenue sharing pool, and the third is his portion of
the fin's fixed costs.
The objective function is obtained by substitutIng (2) into (1), then into (4),
and then into (3). Maximization yields the first order condition,




The solution to (5) for all partners i in the firm is a Nash equilibrium. Equation
(5) can be interpreted as indicating that the utility maximizing level of effort is
where the marginal revenue product of effort (the first term in (5)) is equal to its
marginal disutility (the second termin(5)). The second order condition also
holds, given the concavity of the function z and the convexity of v1. Equation (5)
implicitly defines an effort supply function for each partner,
e, —e1(a,P, n, X, O), (6)
where effort is a function of the compensation scale (a), price (P), group size (n),
demand factors (X), and other fixed factors (') Table 2 contaIns comparative
static derivatives for the effort supply function for the effects of changes in a,
11P, n, X, or on the optimal (for the partner) choice of e1. Factors which
increase the expected return to effort, a and P, increase its supply. The number of
members in the group decreases the return to effort by decreasing the size of an
individual share from the revenue sharing pool, and thus decreases effort. Neither
risk (as represented by the variance of income) nor risk aversion affects the supply
of effort. This result is directly due to the assumption of the additive
separability of demand Into its deterministic and stochastic components. We specify
a test for this assumption in Section IV.
B. The Group
The group, or fin, makes a collective decision on the choice of incentives,
given the effort reaction functions of all the members of the firm. Since the
choice of incentive systems directly affects the variance of income, the group must
make an explicit tradeoff between incentives and risk spreading.
Let there be a representative partner i whose preferences are decisive in the
collective decision-making process)3 Then the group#s utility function can be





-Ba2P2- B(1/n)2(I-a)2P2Zo2- v1(.), (1)
where the explicit expression for a,f2 is incorporated.
"For example, the median voter under majority rule. Cave and Salant (1987)
prove the existence of a unique majority rule equilibrium for a game such as the one
examined here, even if preferences are not single-peaked. We employ this simple
representation since our data do not allow us to distinguish between alternative
models of group decision making. We do not assume that partners are identical within
groups since evidence from our data does not support such a conjecture.
12The group chooses a and n to maxImize (7), subject to the effort reaction
functions of the n partners, as sumarized in (5)14.15 Let the model be




Substituting for the partners' effort supply functions and the quality production








-(1/nfl8FC/ön)+ (B/n2)(1 -a)P2qZ] — (10)
"We treat price as exogenous in order to focus on the choice ofcompensation
method and group size. The results derived in this section follow through when
price is treated as endogenous. The first-order conditions with ,n,and P chosen
by the firm are contained in the technical appendix.
'5TMs is the first-order approach. See Jewitt (1988) for a justification of
this approach which does not rely on convexity of the distribution function of
output.
161f the distribution of preferences/abilities across agents in the firm is
syiimietric, then the median agent Is the mean agent. The first-order conditions when
the model is not necessarily synretric are contained in the technical appendix. The
qualitative results are identical to those obtained with the synmietric model.
'Weassumethat an individual rationality or participation constraint is
satisfied so that no agent's utility is below his reservation level.
13The first terms in both equations indicate the incentive effects associated with
a and n, incorporating the reactions of the partners. The terms which are preceded
by B, the risk aversion parameter, indicate the risk spreading effects of and n.
These indicate that a and n are set where the marginal utility of the marginal
revenue generated by the effort supply response to a or n is equal to the marginal
disutility of the same effort supply response plus the marginal utility of the
effect on risk. These tradeoffs imply that the optimal E(0,1)and the optimal
n E(0,+c).15
C.Coarat1ve Statics
Consider the choices of a and n in the absence of risk aversion (or risk). A
risk neutral collective of agents would choose a equal to one and set membership at
the size which fully exploits all scale economies, denoted n*. To see this, set the
risk preference parameter, B, equal to zero in equations (9) and (10). The
resulting first-order condition for the choice of a is equal to the partner's first-
order condition for choice of effort (equation (5)) when a—I, thus implying that the
optimal a equals one when 8—0 or —0.The first-order condition for the choice
of n reduces to (I/n)FC —arc/an,thus group size is set so that marginal cost
equals average cost.
When partners are risk averse (8>0), the a and n chosen by the firm will always
be respectively less than and greater than the a and n chosen by risk neutral
partners. When 8>0, additional terms related to risk are included in the first
order conditions. Since the term related to risk in (9) is negative, the a which is
optimal in the presence of risk aversion is less than the first-best a under risk
"See the technical appendix for proofs.
14neutrality. Similarly, the risk aversion term in equation (10) is positive, thus
the presence of risk aversion implies increased membership In the firm."
Figure 4 illustrates the result that risk aversion leads to a<t and n>n*. The
combinations of a and n which satisfy the first-order conditions (FOC) evaluated at
6—0 and 6>0 are depicted. Since the a and n chosen are those which simultaneously
solve these equations, the equilibrium is located at the intersection of these
curves. A0A0 represents the locus of points at which the FOC for a is satisfied
when 3—0, and N0N0 is the locus for which the FOC for n is satisfied when 8—0. When
B—a the FCC for a does not depend on n and the F0C for n does not depend on a.
Therefore A0A0 is horizontal and NN is vertical. A,A, and N,N, are the loci of the
FOC for a and a when B>0. Since the values of a which satisfy the FCC for a when
3>0 are less than those which satisfy it when 6—0, A1A1 lies everywhere beneath A0A0.
Similarly, N,N1 lies everywhere to the right of N.N because the values of n which
satisfy the FOC for a when 8>0 are greater than the n which satisfy it when 6—0.
Taken together, this implies that the firm will choose ad and n>n in the presence
of risk aversion.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that further increases In risk aversion
generate further decreases in a and further increases in a. Table 3 contains the
comparative static derivatives of the choice variables for the group. The
comparative static effects of 8 (risk aversion) on a and a are Indeterminate. the
reason is that increases in a generate increased efficiency incentives, but decrease
risk spreading. Analogously, Increasing group size decreases incentives, but
increases risk spreading. In general, any combination of effects on a and n are
'We have assumed that a-• cov(c11c1)—0for ease of exposition. All that
is needed for this conclusion; 'however, is that a <1.Obviously, however, the
greater is the less effective is group size at spreading risk.
15possible which result in an increased tradeoff of incentives for risk-spreading. An
increase in a and decrease in n due to increased risk aversion is not possible,
however, since this implies a decreased tradeoff of incentives for risk-spreading.
The possible combinations of an increase in risk aversion on a and n can be
fruitfully examined by inspection of a diagram showing how the curves representing
the FOC shift in response to a change in B. Figure 5 illustrates the three outcomes
which are possible. An increase in risk aversion always shifts both curves down and
to the right (to the southeast" of the original equilibrium point). If there is a
larger effect on the FOC for n, then both a and n can increase. This is illustrated
in panel A.Panel B shows the case when there is a larger effect on the a FOC:
both a and n fall. Panel C illustrates the result if an increase in risk aversion
has roughly equal effects on the FOC for a and for n. In this case the classic
result obtains: a falls and n rises. The one outcome which does not obtain is an
increase in a and a decrease in n, since this would involve a point in the northwest
quadrant, which is inpos:ole in the diagram. This would imply an attenuated
tradeoff of incentives for risk-spreading in the presence of increased risk
aversion, which is inconsistent with the model.
IV. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION MD ESTIMATIONHE1HOOS
Forthe empirical work the theoretical framework is generalized to take account
of two important institutional factors: (1) that physician groups are not really
price takers, but rather participate in an imperfectly competitive market, and (2)
that the physician production of medical services involves more than just physician
input. Moreover, consistent with the institutional facts presented in section II,
we assume that the group rather than the physician makes decisions over price and
non-physician inputs.
16The theoretical framework implies a five equation empirical model. Four
equations will represent the group's decisions about a, n, P and h (non-physician
labor), and one equation will represent the physician's output. The rest of this
section is used to derive the specification and present the estimation strategy. We
begin by specifying the group's decisions and then present the physician's problem.
The first order conditions for the group's optimization problem can be solved for
the equilibrium values of the compensation system (a), group size (n), price (p),
and non-physician labor (h):
—a(B,X, •, W, EC, (13)
—n(B,X, 8, W, FC, a12), (14)
—NB,X, 9, w,FC,c2), (15)
h —h(B,X, O, W, FC, 0Z) (16)
Thus, the compensation system, group size, price, and non-physician labor are
functions of risk aversion (B), the variance of the fluctuations in physicians'
residual demand functions (a12), variables that shift the residual demand functions
(X), prices of inputs (W), fixed costs (EC), and characteristics of the physician
that may influence their productivity, such as experience or training (8).
Given the group's decisions over the organization of the firm, the individual
physician then chooses effort. Since quality and effort are unobserved, the demand
function cannot be estimated directly.2° Instead, we substitute the effort supply
function into the quality production function, and then substitute that equation
20Note that the parameters of the structural demand function cannot be
recovered, because they enter the demand function both directly and indirectly
through the functions z and e1.This implies that when incentives affect
unobservable behavior, structural parameters cannot in general be recovered from
observed data. Gaynor and Pauly (1990) and Spulber (1989) have shown that this
point is also true with respect to the parameters of the technology of production.
17into the demand function to obtain a demand function conditional on the firm level
variables:
—g(P,a, n, h, X, °) + (17)
The conditional demand function, then, is a function of price, the compensation
scalt, group size, exøgenous demand factors, and physician characteristics.
Linear functional representations of equations (13) -(16)and (11) form the
empirical model. The conditional demand function and the expressions for the firm's
choices of a, n, P. and h establish the link between risk preferences, incentives,
and production (and consequently, income). Risk preferences influence the firm's
choices of a, ii, P, and h, and these choices influence the physician's productivity.
Thus, equations (13) -(16)identify how risk preferences influence the group's
choice of Incentive and organizational structure, and equation (17) permits
estimation of the effect of the incentive and organizational structure on
productivity.
Since a, n, P and It are collectively chosen by the firm based in part on
physicians' effort responses to these choices, they may be correlated with the error
term in the conditional demand function. Therefore, least squares estimates of the
conditional demand function may suffer from simultaneous equations bias. Rather
than making arbitrary assumptions, we employ the exogenelty test of Hausman (1978)
and Wu (1973) to examine whether these variables can be treated as uncorrelated with
the error ten In the regression. The model is estimated by two-stage least
squares, instrumenting for those variables for which exogeneity is rejected.
The empirical model is identified with a set of exclusion restrictions implied by
the theory. Specifically, the fin's choices of a, n, P, and h depend on risk
preferences, the variance in income, input prices, and fixed costs, whereas the
18physician's choice of effort does not. As the empirical results indicate below,
these identifying variables are significant predictors in the first-stage
regressions, adding power to the exogeneity tests.
The assumption that demand is additively separable into deterministic and
stochastic components implies that neither risk aversion (B) nor risk (a2) enter
the conditional demand function (18). Since the model is overidentified, this
assumption is testable. The assumption of an additive shock to demand Is rejected
if the variables representing risk aversion and risk are significantly different
from zero in the conditional demand function. Recall that additivity of the random
component is also a test of the mean-variance representation of utility.
The assumption that production is non-joint In other partners' effort is also
testable. This assumption implies the null hypothesis that the characteristics of
other physicians in the group should have no impact on physician i's output. This




The data utilized for this study come from a nationwide survey of medical group
practices conducted in 1978. The sample includes 957 groups and 6353 physicians
practicing in those groups. The sample was stratified by group size, type of group
(multispecialty or single specialty), physician specialty, and prepaid vs.
fee-for-service. Large group practices were oversampled in an effort to supply a
reasonable number of observations, and a census was taken of pre-paid groups, for
the same purpose. Further, five medical practice specialties were sampled: general
practice, internal medicine, pediatrics, general surgery, and obstetrics/gynecology.
19Approximately 60 percent of all office-based physicians practice in these
specialties.
This data set also includes data measuring characteristics of the area in which
the group practiced and data on the hospital with which the group is affiliated.
The data on area characteristics were obtained fron many sources, including the
Mierican Medical Association, The County and City Data Book, and various other
sources. The hospital data were obtained from the American Hospital Association
Guide for 1978. For a complete description of all these data sources see 2oldin,
Carcagno, Held, Jamieson, and Wooldridge (1979).
B. Variables
The model consists of five equations. The unit of observation for the
compensation system, group size, price and non-physician input equations is the
group, and the unit of observation for the conditional demand function isthe
physician. We begin by describing the measurement of the dependent variables for
all five equations and then discuss the Independent variables. Exact definitions of
the variables are reported in Table Al in the Appendix, and descriptive statistics
are reported In Table A2.
The measure of a is the "compensation scale," which takes on values one through
ten. A value of one indicates that the physician's compensation Is completely
unrelated to productivity and a value of ten indicates a perfect relationship.21
The variable Is divided by ten in order have it correspond directly to ,whichis
theoretically bounded by zero and one. We Impose these bounds by taking a logit
transformation, ln(a/(I-a)), as the dependent variable In equation (13). The
211he compensation scale is highly correlated with other measures of the
compensation system. The simple correlation between the compensation scale and the
percent of compensation which is based on productivity is 0.91. The correlation
between the compensation scale and the change In net income per $1000 of patient
billings is 0.96.
20dependent variable is retransformed into a predicted value of a for the second-stage
estimation of the conditional demand function.
Physician output is taken to be the number of office visits per week for primary
care physicians,a for whom office visits are a large proportion of total practice.
The number of full-time equivalent physicians in the group corresponds to the
theoretical variable for group size, n. The log of the group's reported price for an
office visit is used to measure price, and the log of hours of non-physician medical
labor is used to measure non-physician Input. The logarithmic transformations of
price and hours are taken because their distributions are heavily skewed to the
right.
The most important independent variable is the measure of physician preferences
for risk. For this, we use responses to a question on the importance of regular
income to the physician. The possible responses take on values from 1 to 4. with 4
representing the greatest importance attached to regular income. We use the within
group average of the responses to this question as a measure of the group's risk
preferences.
Such self-reported measures have proven to be valid and reliable in a number of
other studies. Wolf and Pohlman (1983) show that self-reported risk preferences are
consistent with estimated risk preferences derived from actual choices. Granbois
and Sunners (1975) demonstrate that self-reported preferences are good predictors of
actual choices. Finally, flaw (1989) reports that self-reported risk preferences
are important determinants of labor market choices.
The other independent variables in the compensation, group size, price, and non-
physician hours equations include physician characteristics that influence their
We employ the retransformation suggested by Goldberger (1968), based on the
assumption that a is distributed lognormal.
General surgeons were excluded from the analysis, since office visits are not
one of their primary outputs.
21productivity, the prices of other factors of production, fixed factors, residual
demand shifters, and the variance of demand. Characteristics that influence
productivity are the average experience of group physicians, experience squared the
proportion of nembers who are foreign medical graduates, and the proportion of
members in each of several medical specialties. The prices of non-physician inputs
are captured by the hourly wage rates of the various categories of non-physician
labor. Fixed factors are proxied by the number of examining rooms. Residual demand
shifters are represented by market area characteristics such as per capita income
and physicians per capita, among others. We do not have a direct measure of the
variance of demand but dichotomous variables indicating whether the group is an HMO
or a multispecialty group may serve as proxies, as well as specialty and the market
area characteristics.
The exogenous independent variables in the conditional demand function include
exogenous determinants of physician demand and physician productivity
characteristics. The productivity characteristics include the physician's
experience and a set of dichotomous variables indicating the physician's specialty
and whether he is a foreign medical schoo' graduate or practices in a subspeclalty.
Demand shifters in both the group level equations and the conditional demand
function are measured by various indicators of market demand such as population
density, hospital beds per capita, income per capita. etc. The same variables that
measure shifts in demand across markets, however, also represent differences in the
variance in de.and across markets. The variance belongs only in the group level
-equations and not in the conditional demand function. Therefore, if these variables
only represent variance, then they will be important determinants of the firm's




A number of the independent variables in the conditional demand function are
potentially endogenous. Specifically, we tested the exogeneity of the compensation
scale, group size, non-physician hours, and price. The exogeneity of the
compensation scale was rejected at the 1% level. The exogeneity of the other
variables could not be rejected.
The specification test for additivity of the random shock consists of a test for
the joint significance of the variables representing risk aversion and the variance
of demand. The importance of regular income is our measure of risk aversion, but we
have no direct measure of the variance of demand. The market area characteristics
such as per capita income or physicians per capita may affect demand variance as
well as the level of demand. Consequently we tested for the significance of the
importance of regular income alone in the conditional demand regression, and jointly
with the market area variables. The importance of regular income is not
significantly different from zero at conventional confidence levels (t —-1.28),nor
is it jointly significant with the area characteristics (F0.84). Therefore we
cannot reject the hypothesis that demand is additively separable in its
deterministic and stochastic components. This result also implies that the mean-
variance utility model cannot be rejected.
The market area variables potentially represent the level of demand across
markets as well as the variance in demand.. Recall that the variables that indicate
the levels enter both the group level equations as well as the conditional demand
function, while the variance enters only the group level equations. The hypotheses
that the individual and joint effects of these variables are zero in the conditional
demand function could not be rejected. Therefore, we conclude that they represent
23indicators of variance as opposed to levels of demand.
The variables representing characteristics of physicians in the group are not
(jointly) statistically significant (F—O.89) in the individual physicians'
conditional demand function. Therefore we cannot reject the hypothesis that
production is non-joint across physicians.
Last, we checked for evidence of the desire to smooth work schedules by including
a variable measuring the importance of regular hours as a regressor in the reduced
form regressions for compensation scale, group size, price, and non-labor hours. It
was never significant, and was therefore ultimately deleted. The values of the
other coefficients were unaffected by the deletion.
B. Discussion
The estimation results for the group level regressions are presented In Table 4
and the results for the conditional demand function are contained in Table 5. The
signs of the coefficients in all regressions are generally as expected. In
addition, the estimates are quite precise, as indicated by the t-statistics.
The results of the first-stage estimations are as predicted by the theory. The
variable which serves as the measure of risk preferences is the importance of
regular income. Here "importance" is interpreted as the physician's subjective
assessment of the weight attached to these factors. The importance of regular
income is negatively related to the compensation scale, indicating that the more
important is regular Income to a physician, the more strongly related to
productivity is his group's compensation structure. This is consistent with the
interpretation of this measure as a metric for risk preferences, and indicates the
24Impact of risk aversion on compensation method.2'
Group size is also negatively related to the importance of regular incoffle.This
accords with the theoretical result that increased risk aversion leads to a smaller
group size if the incentive effects of decreased group size outweigh the decreased
risk spreading. Thus, variation in risk preferences can lead to an equilibrium with
many different group sizes, regardless of the nature of returns to scale. This is
compatible with the observed wide range of sizes of physician practices.
Physician experience has a negative and decreasing effect on the compensation
scale and a positive and decreasing effect on group size, non-physician hours, and
price. The effect of experience on the closeness of the relation between
compensation and individual productivity is negative up to 3.54 years of experience.
Beyond that it is positive, although the total effect is negative. The negative
quadratic effect is consistent with findings of both a positive relationship between
age and the performance-relatedness of compensation for corporate CEO's (Gibbons and
Murphy. 1989) and a negative relationship (Barro and Barro, 1990). The positive
effect could be due to the presence of career concerns, as hypothesized by Gibbons
24An alternative interpretation is that this variable Is measuring variance due
to sorting rather than risk preferences. Suppose all physicians have identical risk
preferences, but are of different qualities which are unobservable to the analyst.
Suppose further that physicians sort themselves among groups according to their
quality. High quality physicians will locate in groups with high a in order to
retain the returns to their quality, and low quality physicians will locate in
groups with low a in an attempt to free ride on others of higher quality. Thus1 the
observed distribution of a represents the distribution of physician quality rather
than a distribution of preferences toward risk. Since the variance of income is
increasing in a (see equation (1)). those in groups with a high value of a will be
subject to a greater variance of income, ceteris paribus, and vice versa for those
in groups with a low value of a. Physicians who are subject to a higher variance of
income may report a greater importance of regular income, and physicians with a
lower variance of Income would report a lesser importance of regular income. This
scenario generates a positive correlation between the Importance of regular income
variable and a. Since we find a negative relation to be the case, this alternative
interpretation cannot be true.
25and Murphy. The overall negative effect may be a way of compensating more senior
colleagues for providing "public goods' to the firm at the expense of their own
productivity. The positive effect of experience on non-physician hours nay indicate
that experience allows physicians to utilize labor more efficiently. The positive
effect on price may reflect consumers' valuations of experience.
The other variables in the firm level regressions also have interesting
Interpretations. Fixed costs. as represented by the number of examining rooms, lead
to increased group size to spread the increased fixed costs, more sharing of output,
fewer non-physician hours, and lower price. An increase in the number of
competitors, as measured by the number of physicians per capita, has positive
effects on both group size and price. The presence of more competitors could lead
physicians to try and 'cartelize" by forming larger groups, which could increase
prices. Alternatively, more competitors ray lead to increased non-price
competition, and higher prices. If reputational economies of scale exist, increased
non-price competition will also increase group size. Multispecialty groups and
HF's have compensation more strongly related to individual productivity, and have
higher prices. The average physician characteristics in the group did not affect
compensation method, but did have significant impacts in some cases on group size,
non-physician hours, or price.
The estimates of the parameters of the conditional demand function in Table S are
also strongly consistent with our theoretical hypotheses. The coefficient for one
of the main variables of interest, the compensation scale (a), is positive and
significant, as hypothesized. An increasingly strong link between compensation and
productivity leads to an increased number of offtce visits per week, Specifically,
unit increases in the compensation scale cause output to increase by ten percent.
Additionally, the number of physicians in the group has a negative and strongly
26significant effect. A ten person increase in group size decreases output by six
percent. This lends support to the hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, incentives are
diminished with increased group size. These are estimates of the effect of
incentives on moral hazard. An alternative interpretation is that these results are
due to physician self-selection by quality, however, there Is little support In the
data for the sorting across groups implied by this hypothesis!
The estimates of the coefficients for some of the other variables are intuitively
appealing. The effect of price on output is negative, and statistically
significant. This indicates that the direct (and negative) effect of price on
demand outweighs its positive impact through supply of quality. A ten percent
increase in price decreases quantity demanded by 3.2 percent. Whether or not the
group is multispecialty or largely prepaid seems to have little effect on output.
The number of examining rooms has a positive and significant impact on quantity,
consistent with Its increasing the marginal product of effort in the quality
production function. The same is true of hours of non-physician personnel.
Experience has a positive but diminishing effect, consistent with greater experience
25As stated earlier, the observed negative relation between the compensation
scale and the reported importance of regular inco4lle is inconsistent with a situation
in which physicians have identical risk preferences and sort themselves among groups
based on their quality. In addition, if there were extensive sorting, then
physicians should be relatively homogenous within groups and therefore most of the
variation In the data should be across (between) groups. We examined the within and
between group variation in observed physician characteristics. In no case was the
variation within groups less than the variation between groups. Table A3 in the
appendix contains these results. As a further check on the degree of sorting, we
compared the variation in residuals from the conditional demand function within and
between groups. The residuals represent unmeasured or unobserved characteristics
plus noise. The variation within groups Is almost identical to the variation
between groups. Last, we could not reject the hypothesis that the distribution of
the group means (i.e., the distribution between groups) was drawn from the same
distribution as the sample distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic0.093). If
there were extensive sorting then the distribution between groups should differ from
the sample distribution. Therefore we conclude that the data do not support an
hypothesis of pervasive sorting by physicians among groups.
27leading to greater productivity, but being counteracted by loss of skill with
increasing age.
Table 6 contains calculations of the effects of changes in the measures of risk
preferences on production, thus providing an Initial look at the tradeoff between
incentives and risk-spreading. Varying the importance of regular income over its
full range (I to 4) leads to an decrease in the number of annual office visits by
872 (based on a 50 week year), or 22.64% at the mean. Evaluated at the mean price
for an office visit ($13.20), the result is decreased revenues of $11,999. This
means that the most risk averse physicians in the sample sacrifice this amount
compared to the least risk averse physicians. This is a measure of the risk premium
in these partnerships. It Is not a complete measure, however, because physicians in
these groups earn income from other sorts of services sold by these groups.
Consequently this figure serves as a lower bound.It does account, however, for
10.76% of mean physician gross income in the U.S. in 1978, indicating that the
tradeoff between incentives and risk-spreading in these firms is substantial.
Breaking the effect of risk aversion down by the source of the effect, it canbe
seen that most of the impact on output (and consequently income) comesvia the
compensation method. Groups do appear to attempt to compensate for the worsened
incentives by having fewer members and hiring more non-physician inputs, but the
magnitudes of the impacts of these variables is small. We hypothesize that the
reason is that they can only substitute in a partial, and very limited way,for
compensation method as an incentive device.
VII.SIJU!ARYNC CONCLUSIOIS
Ourgoal In this paper has been to analyze the determinants of the internal
organization of partnerships and the consequent impacts on performance. Wefocus
specifically on the impact of risk aversion on the choice of compensation methodand
28membership size In a partnership firm and the resultant effects on productivity.
Consistent with the institutional facts about professional partnerships, our
theoretical model allows the firm to choose both the compensation method and the
membership size. The predictions are that risk aversion will cause incentives to be
sacrificed. The effect of risk aversion relative to risk neutrality is to cause
groups to adopt compensation methods which are less closely related to individual
productivity, and to choose group sizes which exceed optimal scale. Further
increases in risk aversion, however, have different combinations of effects on
compensation method and group size, depending on the relative magnitudes of the
incentive versus the risk spreading effects of those variables. These combined
effects, however, all lead to a tradeoff of incentives for risk spreading.
This is the first empirical study of incentives in organizations which
incorporates risk aversion. The evidence is highly consistent with the theory of
incentives and moral hazard for a partnership firm. We estimate a two-stage model
of the impact of risk aversion on medical partnerships' choices of compensation
method, group size, non-member labor, and price, and consequently on output. The
results are strongly supportive of theory that argues that firms adopt second-best
incentive structures in order to spread risk. Increased risk aversion leads
partnerships to choose compensation methods which are tess closely related to
individual productivity and to decrease the number of members. Productivity based
compensation has a substantial positive effect on physician productivity, and group
size has a negative impact. Last, our findings indicate that there is a substantial
premium paid to risk aversion: the most risk averse physicians in the sample
sacrifice almost 11% of gross income relative to those who are least risk averse.
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MEANS OF THE COMPENSATION SCALE AND GROUPSIZEBY
IMPORTANCE OF REGULAR INCOME'
Importance of Compensation









Standarderrors reported In parentheses belowmeans.
4—VeryImportant, 3—Important, 2—Somewhat Important, 1—Of Little or No ImportanceTABLE 2
COMPARATIVE STATIC EFFECTS ON
Variable Comoarative Static Derivative'









'0 is the deteninant of the matrix forming the second order condition.
bNeither risk aversion nor risk (variance of income)affectthe supply of
effort. This is due to the demand function being additively separable in its
deterministic and stochastic components.TABLE 3
COMPARATIVESTATIC EFFECTS FOR THE FIRM
Cpmparptiy!Static Deriyatiy
9/9B —(-(ö2u1/8n2)(a2u/aa8B)+(82u/aaan)(02u1/anaB)).IJITh





FIRST-STAGE OLS COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES ANDT-STATISTICS
Log it
(Compensation Ln(Non-Physician
scaleic Group size hours) Ln(Price)
Independent
Variables
Constant 6.47 22.15*** 393*** 2.09*
(4.65) (6.10) . (22.90) (26.43)
Importance of _0.61*** -O.66 0.03** 0.003
regular incomed (5.36) (2.15) (2.03) (0.45)
Preferred sized0.04*** 0.76* 0.003*** O.003
(4.58) (35.65) (2.59) (7.68)
Experienced _0.12*** 0.40*** 0.01
(2.81) (3.57) (2.49) (5.67)
Experience. 0.003*** -O.01 -0.0005
-0.0003"
squaredd (2.60) (4.85) (3.61) (4.65)
Foreign medical -0.39 4•73*** .0.32*** -0.03
graduated (0.67) (3.07) (4.50) (1.03)
Subspecialt? -0.19 2.36* _0.17*** 0.04***
(0.76) (3.58) (5.53) (2.71)
Percent general -0.04 -0.21 -0.0008 -0.002
surgery (5.53) (9.73) (0.83) (3.48)
Percent -0.004 0.02*** -0.002 0.0009
pediatrics (1.36) (2.63) (5.40) (5.51)
Percent -0.01" -0.01 -0.001 0.003***
obstetrics! (3.59) (1.44) (2.67) (18.91)
gynecology
• t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the parameter estimates.
-Significantat 10% confidence level or better.
-Significantat 5% confidence level or better.
-Significantat 1% confidence level or better.
The dependent variable is the ogit transformation of the compensation scale
These are averages taken over physicians in each group.lADLE 4 (Cont'd.)
FIRST-STAGE OLS COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES AND TSTATISTICS
log It
(Compensation Ln(Non-Physician
scaler GrouD size hours 1n(Pric)
Independent
Variables
Percent 0.01 -0.08 O.001••* 0.oo2*t
internal (4.57) (10.67) (4.26) (15.71)
ned Ic I ne
Percent board -0.002 0.03 0.002*** -0.000004
certified (0.58) (4.40) (5.38) (0.03)
Wage of a -0.10 0.61*** 0.009 0.01
registered (1.38) (3.06) (0.94) (2.46)
nurse
Wage of a .0.41*** 0.04 .0.08*** 0.03***
licensed (3.54) (0.12) (5.40) (4.07)
practical nurse
Wage of a 0.05 0.07 0.0008 .0003**S
business (3.64) (2.22) (0.52) (4.27)
administrator
Wage of a 0.03 -0.13 0.05*** 0.02***
certified lab (0.37) (0.64) (5.39) (4.13)
technician
Wage of an _0.45*** .0.71* _0.08*** .0.02*
uncertified lab(2.99) (1.74) (4.53) (1.78)
technician
Wage of a 0.04 j55*** 0.009 0.01
graduate (0.59) (8.79) (1.16) (2.83)
physician assistant
Examining rooms-0.003 0.06*** 0.001 -0.0005
(2.36) (16.46) (7.08) (6.63)
WlO 1.27** 1.34 0.34*** 0.08**
(2.00) (0.79) (4.72) (2.10)
Multispeclalty l.51 0.20 0.03 QQ5*
(7.74) (0.37) (1.19) (4.67)TABLE 4 (Cont'd.)
FIRST-STAGE 015 COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES AND T-STATLST1CS
Log it
(Compensation Ln(Non-Physician
scale)c Grout size hours) Ln(Price)
Independent
Variables
Beds per capita-0.14 0.15 0.001 -o.o2"
(2.52) (0.98) (0.21) (6.38)
Physicians 0.05 0.72 0.02 0.02**
per capita (0.30) (1.77) (1.25) (2.30)
Rent .002*** O.03*** -0.0007 _0.002*t
(4.97) (2.20) (1.16) (6.12)
AFOC 0.20 O.71*** .0.03*** 0.07
(3.92) (5.29) (4.34) (22.80)
Population 0.0004*** -0.0002 0.0000! 0.00002
density (2.96) (0.65) (0.71) (2.15)
Per capita 0.00009 0.0005 -0.000005 0.00002
income (1.01) (2.26) (0.51) (3.37)
Education 0.20** -0.93 0.02 0.005
(1.97) (3.33) (1.44) (0.81)
0.10 0.60 0.11 0.45
11.49*** 144.88 12.05*** 80.37***
II 419 419 419 419TABLE 5
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATES OF THE CONDITIONAL DEMAND FUNCTION







Ln(Hours of non-physician personnel) o.1i
(2 .32)
Ln(Price)























t-statistlcs are reported in parentheses below the parameter estimates.
The standard errors have been corrected for the use of instrumental
variables.
-Significantat 10% confidence level or better.
-Significantat 5% confidence level or better.
-Significantat 1% confidence level or better.
Instrumental variable.TABLE 6
THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN MORALHAZARDAND RISK SPREADING:
ESTIMATESOFTHE EFFECT ON AN INCREASE IN THE IMPORTANCE
































in Importance of regular income from I to 4.
means.
on a SO week year.
on a mean price of $13.20 per office visit in the data.
on a mean annual gross income for physicians of $111,900
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FIGURE 4
COJQARING THE FI4'S CHOICE OF COIWENSATION I€THOD AND






















VARIABLE ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS
Yarlable Definition
Office Visits The number of office visits by the physician per week
Compensation Scale A scale varying between 1 and 10, increasing with strength
of relation between compensation and productivity
Price The usual, customary and reasonable price charged for an office
visit by the group
Wage of a Registered The mean wage paid to registered nurses In the group
Nurse
Wage of a Licensed The mean wage paid to licensed practical nurses in the group
Practical Nurse
Wage a Business The mean wage paid to business administrators in the group
Administrator
Wage of a Certified The mean wage paid to certified laboratory technicians in the Lab
Technician group
Wage of an Uncertified The mean wage paid to uncertified lab technicians in the group
Lab Technicians
Wage of a Graduate The mean wage paid to graduate physician assistants in the group
Physician Assistant
Group Size The number of full time equivalent physicians in the group
1*10 Duimiy variable indicating if 50 percent or more of the
group's revenues are prepaid
Examining Rooms The number of examining rooms per FIE M.D.
Hours of Non-Physician Total hours of non-physician medical personnel per week
Medical Personnel
Experience Number of years since the physician graduated from medical school
General Practice, Physician specialty dunmiles for general practice, pediatrics,
Pediatrics, Obstetrics! and obstetrics/gynecology, respectively -internalmedicine Is
Gynecology excluded.TABLE Al (Cont'd.)
VARIABLE ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS
Variable Definition
Multispecialty Dunmiyvariablefor whether the group is multi- or
Group single-specialty
Presence of Graduate Dui.iiy variable for whether there a graduate physician
Physician Assistant assistant
Importance of RegularVaries between one and four, increasing with importance
Income to Physician
Preferred Size The group size preferred by the physician
Board Certified Dumy variable indicating if the physician Is board
certified
Foreign Medical Duimiyvariableindicating if the physician graduated from a
Graduate foreign medical school
Subspecialty Duniny variable indicating If the physician practices on a
subspeci al ty






Percentboard Percent of the group who are board certified
certified
Beds per capita Hospital beds per 1,000 population in the county in which the
group is located. Takes on integer values €(I,6]
Rent The median gross rent in the group's county
AFDC Percentof the population on AFOCinthe group's
county, lakes on integer values E(1,6J
Population density Population per square mile In the group's county
Per Capita Income Per capita incone in the group's county
Education Median number of years of education of the over 25 population In
the group's county
Physicians per capitaNon-federal active physicians per 1,000 population in the groups
countyTABLE A2
VARIABLE MEANS AND STANDARD ERRORS
Variable Standard Error
Office visits 94.23 58.65
Compensation scale 6.16 2.18
Group size 21.13 8.73
Price 13.20 2.30
Importance of regular income 2.78 0.37
Hours of non-physician 55.65 13.97
medical personnel
Examining rooms 56.40 49.55
Experience 19.88 10.70





Board certified 0.69 0.46
KIlO 0.06 0.28
Multispecialty 0.65 0.48
Preferred size 12.13 6.88
Percent general surgery 7.68 6.62
Percent pediatrics 13.63 16.95
Percent obstetrics/gynecology 12.12 15.53
Percent internal medicine 28.37 17.88
Percent board certified 77.39 16.05
Wage of a registered nurse 4.87 0.57
Wage of a licensed practical 3.68 0.44
nurse
Wage of a business administrator 12.23 3.47
Wage of a certified lab 4.82 0.69
technician
Wage of an uncertified lab 3.65 0.29
technician
Wage of a graduate physician 6.94 0.64
assistant
Bedsper capita 3.43 0.74
Physicians per capita 1.52 0.32
Rent 103.76 14.19
AFDC 2.86 0.87
Population density 524.35 423.57
Per capita income 4735.66 736.97
Education 11.81 0.55TABLE A3
THE VARIATION IN INDIVIDUAL PHYSICIAN PREFERENCES AND CHARACTERISTICS
WITHIN VERSUS 8ENEEN GROUPS
Standard Deviations
Variable Within Betwein
Importance of regular incone 0.61 0.583
Importance of regular hours 0.59 0.589
Preferred group size 17.724 17.34
Experience 8.929 6.801
Foreign medical graduate 0.208 0.127
Board certified 0.345 0.339
Subspecialty 0.323 0.334TECHNICAL APPEM)IX
I.First OrderConditionsfor the Asvm,etric Model
























where and a are the output and variance associated with the additional
member.
The basic results of this model are the same as those of the synnetric
model. The variables a and n are set so that marginal revenue, and marginal
cost (including disutility), and marginal risk are balanced. If there is no
A-Irisk or risk aversion (e.g., 8—0) these reduce to conditions for the first-
best, thus a—i and n—n. Moving from risk neutrality (8—0) to risk aversion
(8>0) leads to ad and n>n. This can be seen by inspection of (A2) and (A3).
Further increases in risk aversion can have any effect which leads to
increased risk-spreading and decreased incentives. The illustrations in
Figure 5 apply regardless of assumptions regarding synmietry.
II. First OrderConditionswith Price Eridopenous fSv,itric Model)
au/oo— (P(3q/Bz)(az/8e1)-(ôv,/8e1)j(8e1/aa)
- 28P2a12(a + (I/n)(I -a)]—0, (A4)
and
8u1/ön(P(8oJ8z)(Oz/3e.) -(8v1/8e1)](Oe./an)+(1/n2)FC
-(I/n)aFC/8n+ (B/n2)(i -a)2P2cjZl— 0. (AS)
and
—[P(Ooj8z)(az/ae)-(8v1/8e1)]3e1/aP
+ q+P(aWDP) - +(I/n)(I-a)2] —0. (A6)
The first order condition for price equates the marginal revenue from
quality supply effects, marginal revenue from price effects, marginal
(disutility) cost from quality supply effects and marginal risk effects to
zero. Since the marginal risk effects are negative, when risk effects are
absent, price will be higher. The effects of further increases in risk
aversion are also indeterminate here, but the combination of aa/8B0, Jn/8B<0,
and aP/8B>0 cannot occur, since this results in increased incentives and less
A-2risk spreading in the presence of increased risk aversion.









So, a E(0,1). II
B.Corollary Al:If B or a —0,then a* •I
Proof: IfBora12—Othen
aU/8aI..0 (l_a)((n_l)/fl)P(8P/aZj(oZt/ae,)(3e1/a0)>O
for all a <I,
a.i. U
C.Protosition A2: fl e (1, •
Proof: By contradiction.
1. n—i.
au,/anj_, —Fc_(dF/On)+(l-a)28S2 > , n* 1.





0.Corollary *2:If B or a 2— 0,then n is set to achieve optnaI
sni e.
Proof:WhenBorg12— 0, a— I. So
—(1/n2)FC-(L/n)(aFC/øn)—0.




8u1/aPI,_ — — + C
SoP< I-c.
A-4